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THE BLOODY TRUTH: EXAMINING AMERICA’S BLOOD
INDUSTRY AND ITS TORT LIABILITY THROUGH THE
ARKANSAS PRISON PLASMA SCANDAL
ABSTRACT
Most of the time, blood transfusions are safe. Over the years, however,
tragedies connected to tainted blood and blood products have ripped
through communities on an international scale. Blood contaminated with
hepatitis C, HIV, and hepatitis B has sickened and killed recipients, causing financial, political, and legal repercussions for those found responsible.
This Note seeks to explore one such tragedy: the Arkansas Prison
Plasma Scandal. Occurring between 1982 and 1994 at the Cummins Prison in Grady, Arkansas, the scandal stemmed from the operation of a blood
product center in which prisoners “bled” in exchange for $7 to $10 per
donation. It is alleged that tainted blood products from the prison were
distributed internationally, and that thousands of people became infected
with hepatitis C as a result.
This Note will address: (1) the nature of the blood business in America, (2) the events at the Cummins prison plasma center and the ensuing
scandal, (3) the response of the Canadian and British legal systems and
governments to the tainted blood victims, and (4) the likely outcome of a
negligence claim against the allegedly responsible parties if the victims
had successfully filed suit.
With this analysis, this Note will show that even if all the alleged facts
about the circumstances at the prison plasma center are true, injured
parties suing in the United States would not be able to prevail in a negligence claim because of the impossibility of proving causation in American
blood product litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
“[W]hy was it that we became the dumping ground for your poison?”
~Michael McCarthy, plaintiff (Canadian hemophiliac infected by tainted blood).1
Blood runs through every human vein,2 pumping through the human
heart3 and powering human life.4 Unlike other necessities such as water,
oil, and even air, blood has no equivalent substitute.5 Throughout the centuries, this precious, life-sustaining fluid has intrigued poets, philosophers,
and doctors. In surgery, on the battlefield, and during childbirth, blood
transfusions often make the difference between life and death.
Today, we still do not entirely understand blood and its unique and
mysterious properties,6 and that lack of understanding has sometimes led
to tragedy.7 Blood is easily contaminated and can become dangerous when
it is tainted or misused.8 Diseased blood turns into poison when transfused, causing illness or death for those who receive it.9
The importance of the U.S. blood supply cannot be overstated: according to the American Red Cross, “[e]very two seconds someone in the U.S.
needs blood,”10 and in the year 2001 alone, fourteen million blood transfu-

1

Nihal Kaneira, Canadian Victims of Tainted Blood to Sue U.S., Clinton, GLOBAL
NEWS WIRE, Feb. 26, 1999.
2
See LAURALEE SHERWOOD, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY: FROM CELLS TO SYSTEMS 371
(Cengage Learning, 7th ed. 2010) (“[V]eins serve as a blood reservoir .... Under resting
conditions, the veins contain more than 60% of the total blood volume.”).
3
See id. at 372.
4
JUSTICE HORACE KREVER, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE BLOOD SYSTEM IN
CANADA 11 (1997), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/hcan-scan/commis
sion_blood_final_rep-e/index.html [hereinafter KREVER COMMISSION REPORT].
5
See Blood Facts, BLOODBOOK.COM, http://www.bloodbook.com/facts.html#GENE
RAL (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). But see Blood Substitutes, BROWN UNIV. DIV. OF
BIOLOGY & MED. (2006), http://biomed.brown.edu/Courses/BI108/2006-108websites
/group09artificialblood/Pages/history.htm. Scientists are working on developing blood
alternatives: “Today, the two most promising red cell substitutes are perfluorocarbonbased oxygen carriers (PFBOCs) and hemoglobin-based oxygen carriers (HBOCs).” Id.
6
See DOUGLAS STARR, BLOOD: AN EPIC HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND COMMERCE at x
(1998).
7
See Blood Facts, supra note 5. But see Blood Substitutes, supra note 5.
8
See Blood Facts, supra note 5.
9
Id.
10
Blood Facts and Statistics, AM. RED CROSS (2012), http://www.redcrossblood.org
/learn-about-blood/blood-facts-and-statistics.
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sions occurred.11 At the same time, the demand for blood is rising at a rate
that available donations and viable donors fail to match.12
This blood shortage means that the commodity is extremely expensive,13 resulting in the development of a lucrative business surrounding its
collection and distribution.14 Indeed, the blood business has been growing
both domestically and internationally15 for decades, and today it is a
multibillion dollar industry16—an industry that few people know much
about.
Most of the time, especially in recent decades, blood transfusions are
safe.17 However, over the years, a few tragedies connected to tainted blood
and blood products have ripped through communities on an international
scale.18 Blood contaminated with hepatitis C, HIV, and hepatitis B has
sickened and killed recipients, causing financial, political, and legal repercussions for those found responsible.19
This Note seeks to explore one such tragedy, the Arkansas Prison
Plasma Scandal, which occurred between 1982 and 1994, when the Cum-

11

Id.
See Blood Substitutes, supra note 5 (“According to Doctor Bernadine Healy, former
president of the American Red Cross, donations are increasing by about 2–3% annually
in the United States, but demand is climbing by between 6–8%.”).
13
See generally STARR, supra note 6.
14
See Lisa M. Korsten, Note, The Global Market for Blood: A Proposal for Expansion and a Consistent System of International Regulation, 11 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 227, 227
(1993) (“It is estimated that there is a $2.5 billion market for transfusion blood in the
United States alone.”).
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
See Knowing Your Options, AM.’S BLOOD CTRS., http://www.americasblood.org/go
.cfm?do=Page.View&pid=247 (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (“The risk of contracting HIV
from a blood transfusion is about one in 1.5 million. That is much less than the risk of
dying from a lightning strike. Thanks to new blood testing procedures, the chance of
getting HCV is about the same.”).
18
See James Harder, More Bad Blood out of Arkansas, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Mar.
12, 2001, at 18.
19
See Linda M. Dorney, Comment, Culpable Conduct with Impunity: The Blood Industry and the FDA’s Responsibility for the Spread of AIDS Through Blood Products, 3 J.
PHARMACY & L. 129, 130 (1994). Even by 1994, blood transfusions had infected a reported 6,311 Americans with HIV, and plasma concentrates infected approximately 12,000
American hemophiliacs. Id.
12
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mins Prison in Grady, Arkansas, operated a blood product20 center in
which prisoners “bled”21 in exchange for $7 to $10 per donation.22
As of 1982, prison blood and plasma were no longer approved for use
in America23 or Canada,24 because prisoners possess a significantly higher
risk of infection than the general population.25 The Arkansas Department
of Corrections (ADC) managed to avoid Food and Drug Administration
(FDA or Agency) warnings and recommendations by employing private
organizations to run the prison blood and plasma program.26 These organizations then sold the blood products to a Canadian blood broker,27 who
distributed them to countries around the world.28 The ultimate buyers of
the product were unaware that they were providing their populations with
prisoners’ blood.29 It is alleged that this “blood laundering”30 resulted in
thousands of people becoming infected with hepatitis C (especially hemophiliacs, for reasons explained in greater depth below).31
Victims of this tainted blood launched class action lawsuits in most of
the purchasing countries,32 and the Canadian government ordered a criminal probe into the circumstances surrounding these transactions.33 Howev20

For the purposes of this Note, the term “blood products” refers to platelets, whole
blood, fresh frozen plasma, and blood coagulants.
21
As will be explained in more detail below, the prisoners donated their plasma
through a special process. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
22
Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, Producer, Concrete Films (Jan. 18, 2011).
This price started out in the early 1960s at $3 to $5 per donation, and increased in the
1980s from $7 to $10. Email Interview with Kelly Duda, Producer, Concrete Films (Nov.
16, 2011) [hereinafter Duda Interview II].
23
See Harder, supra note 18.
24
See Anthony DePalma, Suit Says Canada Imported Tainted Blood from U.S. Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at A4.
25
See André Picard & Anne McIlroy, Hemophiliacs Launch $1-Billion Suit over Use
of U.S. Prisoners’ Plasma, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Jan. 28, 1999, at A7.
26
Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22.
27
See Harder, supra note 18.
28
Id.
29
FACTOR 8 (Concrete Films 2005).
30
Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22.
31
See Michael J. Miller, Note, Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Care
for Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 475 (1994); see also discussion infra Part I.A.1.
32
See Tomoko Otake, Blood Battle Is About the Past and Future, JAPAN TIMES, Sept.
14, 2006. Plaintiffs have been reasonably successful in France and Japan, where responsible parties in tainted blood scandals have been sent to prison. Id.; see also Ian Birrell,
2,000 Dead and Still No Justice for the Victims of Britain’s Blood Transfusion Scandal,
DAILY MAIL, Oct. 19, 2010 (Good Health Viewpoint) (“In Canada, the Red Cross was
prosecuted for negligence.”).
33
See FACTOR 8, supra note 29.
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er, as of March 2012, there are no available records of either a victim
filing a similar lawsuit in the United States, or of any U.S. criminal investigation of the scandal occurring.34
This Note will address: (1) the nature of the blood business in America, (2) the events at the Cummins prison plasma center and the ensuing
scandal, (3) the responses of the Canadian and British legal systems and
governments to the tainted blood victims, and (4) the likely outcome of a
negligence claim against the allegedly responsible parties if the victims
had successfully filed suit. The time for such actions has now passed,35 but
this Note will contrast the events at Cummins with similar hepatitis and
HIV transfusion litigation to explain the reasoning a court might follow.
With this analysis, this Note will show that even if all the alleged facts
about the circumstances at the prison plasma center are true, injured parties suing in the United States would not be able to prevail in a negligence
claim because of the impossibility of proving causation in American blood
product litigation.
Because no direct American legal action regarding the information in
this Note has occurred, it is impossible to be sure all the facts regarding
the prison plasma program are true, though there are more than enough
witness accounts, international lawsuits, newspaper articles, inquiries,
documentaries, and reports to provide the evidence needed to state a
claim.36 The negligence suit discussed below is based on the assumption
that all of the plaintiffs’ allegations could be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.37

34

But cf. Barrie McKenna, Canadian Hemophiliacs to Sue U.S. Government, THE
GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Feb. 25, 1999, at A16. This proposed lawsuit never came to
fruition. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
35
The typical statute of limitations for negligence and products liability cases is approximately four years, and because most of these infections occurred in the 1980s and
1990s, the statute of limitations would preclude the case from being heard. See, e.g.,
Lynnette S. Pisone, Case Note, Walls v. Armour: Upholding the Principles of Liability, 3
J. PHARMACY & L. 225, 228–29 (1994) (discussing Florida’s four-year statute of limitations).
36
WILLARD B. RIANO, FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 495 (Rex Printing Co.,
Inc. 2005) (“In considering the dismissal of a case for failure to state a cause of action,
the inquiry is the sufficiency of the material allegations of the complaint and not the
veracity of the allegations.”).
37
THOMAS BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 25–26 (Thomson 2003). A preponderance
of the evidence is the standard of proof for a civil suit, and it means that the trier of fact
must find that the plaintiff’s claim is more likely true than not. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Blood, Blood Products, and Tainted Blood
1. Blood and Blood Products
A healthy adult body contains four to five liters of whole blood.38
Whole blood is rarely utilized in transfusions anymore: as science advanced, medical personnel learned how to transfer only the blood components required by the recipient.39 The basic blood transfusion involves the
simple transfer of red blood cells from one person to another, usually at a
hospital during a surgery.40
In addition to this method, however, is the lesser-known and more
profitable use of plasma,41 which can be used to manufacture clotting
products42 for hemophiliacs.43 The use of these clotting factors, beginning
in the 1960s, has doubled the average hemophiliac’s life expectancy.44
Under this process, after blood is collected, it is “spun off”45 through
plasmapheresis,46 and its component parts are used for different purpos38

KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 15. Each whole blood cell is composed of three different components: plasma, red blood cells, and the “buffy coat” (a thin
layer containing white blood cells and platelets). Id.
39
Id. at 45.
40
Id. at 3, 24.
41
Walter Rugaber, Prison Drug and Plasma Projects Leave Fatal Trail, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 1969, at 1. Plasma makes up about fifty-five percent of a unit of blood. Under
the process of plasmapheresis, an entire unit of blood is taken from the donor, then the
plasma is spun out and the remaining cells are re-injected. Id.
42
See Dorney, supra note 19, at 133.
43
Hemophilia is a genetic blood disorder that occurs primarily in males and causes
spontaneous internal bleeding. Until scientific developments in the 1960s allowed hemophiliacs to inject themselves with plasma products, many of them died at a young age,
and those with severe cases could not even engage in normal daily activities for fear of
causing a deadly bleed. Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan, France, and the United States, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 664 (2000).
Before the widespread use of the clotting products, the average hemophiliac died at age
eleven; since these products have grown more commonplace, that age has risen to twenty-one. Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 88-392-CIV-T-15C, 1990 U.S. Dist. WL 369571,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1990).
44
STARR, supra note 6, at xiv.
45
The unit of blood is placed in a centrifuge which spins off the plasma, allowing the
rest of the blood to be returned to the donor. See DePalma, supra note 24, at A4.
46
This new method greatly increased the quantity of plasma available because it was
no longer necessary to use whole blood (including red blood cells); thus, the donors did
not become anemic. Also, red blood cells take several weeks to replenish, while plasma
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es.47 The plasma of thousands of donors is pooled48 together49 to create
factor concentrates that form a blood product, known as Factor VIII,50
used to medicate hemophiliacs.51
Depending on the severity of the disease, a hemophiliac might need to
use Factor VIII several times a week.52 This means, essentially, that people who are already ill with a life-threatening disease and a compromised
immune system have no alternative but to inject themselves with plasma
hundreds of times a year. If one of the plasma donors (out of many hundreds or thousands53) is infected with a blood-borne disease, the entire
product will be tainted.54 From this point, it is extremely likely that the
hemophiliac, an innocent bystander,55 will contract the disease as well,
and might unknowingly pass it to another. Because of the factors disregenerates within days. Because of these improvements, donations could occur much
more frequently and safely. STARR, supra note 6, at 207–08.
47
SALLY V. RUDMANN, TEXTBOOK OF BLOOD BANKING AND TRANSFUSION MEDICINE
233 (Elsevier Saunders, 2d ed. 2005).
48
At the same time the pool of donors for plasma products was growing, the federal
government stopped using the same process entirely for whole blood because of the
increased risk of hepatitis and the availability of safer alternatives. Unfortunately, no such
safer alternatives existed for the clotting factors, so the general prohibition against pooling did not extend to them. STARR, supra note 6, at 225.
49
See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. The process can include anywhere from 1,000 to 60,000 donors. Id.
50
Factor VIII and Factor IX are actually proteins in the blood that allow coagulation
to occur. Hemophiliacs suffer from an insufficiency of these proteins. Wadleigh v.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The synthetic replacements that are created by donated plasma are also known as Factor VIII and Factor IX.
Id. at 414. This Note is primarily concerned with Factor VIII.
51
KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
52
Id.
53
Feldman, supra note 43, at 665. In the words of documentary filmmaker Kelly
Duda, “units of plasma are pooled into large vats in the making of Factor VIII (imagine
some poison being stirred into a large pot of soup).” Duda Interview II, supra note 22.
54
Gullone v. Bayer Corp. (In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig.),
484 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). To “cleanse” tainted blood of HIV and hepatitis C, the
blood bank must utilize a heat treatment or other method of viral inactivation on the
blood or blood product before it is distributed. Id. A government-sponsored 1995 report
by the Institute of Medicine found that plasma product manufacturers proved especially
slow to implement these safety measures because there were no competitive incentives,
and the government failed to insist the system be revamped to comply with new standards. Donna Shaw, Regulators Blamed in AIDS Deaths Lapses Led to Tainted Blood,
Says New Report, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14, 1995, at A01.
55
See Feldman, supra note 43, at 669 (“Hemophiliacs ... considered themselves the
passive, ‘innocent’ victims of a ‘drug-induced disaster’ that was the fault of physicians,
elected officials, government regulators, pharmaceutical companies, and blood banks
....”).
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cussed above, the chance of a recipient becoming infected by a blood
product is much higher than the risk of infection from whole blood.56
The FDA is responsible for regulating the manufacture of Factor VIII
products57 under its authority from the Pure Food and Drug Act and the
Public Health Service Act.58 The Agency is charged with approving any
changes to the manufacturing process or packaging of the clotting factor,
and it licenses the producers and approves the concentrates before they are
distributed.59 In addition, the Agency inspects the blood plasma collection
facilities producing Factor VIII, and these centers must comply with FDA
rules.60
If these rules are violated, those responsible can be imprisoned or
fined,61 and licenses can be suspended (temporary) or revoked (permanent).62 States are allowed to supplement FDA regulations63 as long as any
additional state laws do not conflict with the federal regulations.
2. Hepatitis C
There are three common viral forms of hepatitis: A, B, and C.64 The
basic definition of all three is: “[A]n inflammation of the liver caused by a
hepatitis virus.”65 Hepatitis C is caused by contact with blood and bodily
fluids of an already infected individual, and no vaccine currently exists to
prevent the disease.66 The risk of transmitting hepatitis A and B through
blood has been known and guarded against for many years; hepatitis C,
however, was not identified or detectable until 1988, after thousands of

56

Id. at 665.
Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
58
Florence Shu-Acquaye & Leanne Innet, Human Blood and Its Transfusion: The
Twists and Turns of Legal Thinking, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 33, 42–43 (2005).
59
Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d at 407–08.
60
Dorney, supra note 19, at 134–35.
61
Id.
62
Duda Interview II, supra note 22.
63
Dorney, supra note 19, at 134–35.
64
A.D.A.M., Inc., Hepatitis Overview, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010) http://health.ny
times.com/health/guides/disease/hepatitis/background.html. Other less common forms of
hepatitis include hepatitis D, E, F, and G. Id.
65
Frequently Asked Questions, HEPATITIS FOUND. INT’L, http://www.hepfi.org/living
/liv_questions.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
66
Id.
57

2012]

THE BLOODY TRUTH

607

people were already infected with the illness.67 No test was available to
check blood products for hepatitis C until 1992.68
Only ten percent of those infected with hepatitis C will escape developing chronic hepatitis.69 Of the ninety percent with chronic hepatitis,
twenty percent will develop cirrhosis of the liver, and one to five percent
will develop liver cancer within twenty years.70 According to the National
Foundation for Infectious Diseases, 8,000 to 10,000 deaths result every
year from hepatitis C infections, and half of the 4,000 liver transplants that
occur annually are for victims of this disease.71 The only treatments available are extremely time-consuming, complicated, and expensive, and they
prove successful less than half of the time.72 It is unlikely that a foolproof
vaccine can be developed because the disease is extremely mutable.73
Dartmouth Medical School estimates that, “[a]ssuming an estimated survival of 40 years, the annual health care costs for the affected U.S. population with chronic hepatitis C may be as high as $9 billion.”74
B. The Blood Business
1. How Much Is the Blood Business Worth?
Blood is one of the most precious and expensive resources in the
world, and it follows that the blood industry is extremely profitable.75 In
1998, a barrel of crude oil was worth $13 per barrel; measured equally,
whole blood was worth over $20,000.76 If the blood were separated, or
fractionated, into its derivative products,77 the value of the same quantity

67

KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
Andres Rueda, Rethinking Blood Shield Statutes in View of the Hepatitis C Pandemic and Other Emerging Threats to the Blood Supply, 34 J. HEALTH L. 419, 423 (2001)
(“Since 1992, a specific antibody assay (ELISA I) has been used to test blood products
for hepatitis C ....”).
69
KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
70
Hepatitis C, NAT’L FOUND. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://www.nfid.org/fact
sheets/hepc.shtml (on file with William & Mary Business Law Review).
71
Id.
72
Rueda, supra note 68, at 420.
73
Id.
74
Hepatitis C: Associated Health Costs—United States, THE C. EVERETT KOOP
INST.—DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., http://www.epidemic.org/theFacts/theEpidemic/USHeal
thCareCosts/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
75
See generally Dorney, supra note 19.
76
STARR, supra note 6, at x.
77
For a discussion describing the fractionating process, see supra Part I.A.1.
68
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in 1998 rises to more than $67,000, while the barrel of oil, including all of
its derivatives, was worth $42.78
By 2001, a blood bank might “charge hospitals anywhere from $55 to
$130 (with $80 being the national average) per unit of blood. Once a unit
of blood is divided into red blood cells, plasma, platelets, and other specialized factors, it produces about $200 in revenues.”79 By 2006, a unit of
blood cost the buyer approximately $200, and once storage and administrative costs were factored in, it is estimated that the actual cost was probably closer to $500.80
If one calculates the barrel of blood example from 1998 with the updated numbers from 2006, it is possible to estimate the rising value of the
commodity between those eight years. Assuming the barrel from 1998
contained the same quantity of the liquid as a standard barrel of oil,81 this
can be estimated to be about 353.33 blood units per barrel.82 If each unit of
blood were worth $200, the total price of the same barrel would have risen
from $67,000 to $70,666, and if each unit were worth $500, the total value
would be $176,665 per barrel of blood. In contrast, as of March 2012 the
value of a barrel of WTI Crude Oil was approximately $107, and the value
of a barrel of Brent Crude Oil was approximately $125.83
2. How Did the System Evolve?
a. Poor Oversight and Commercialization
When the blood business first boomed in the 1960s and 1970s,84 it suffered from poor oversight and regulation.85 This led to cases of blood
78

STARR, supra note 6, at x–xi.
Rueda, supra note 68, at nn.84–85 (2001); see also Scott Hensley, FDA Could OK
Costly Blood Standards; An Expert Says That like Chicken Soup, Removal of White Cells
from Blood Supply Can’t Hurt, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 29, 1999, at 8.
80
See Blood Substitutes, supra note 5.
81
A standard barrel of oil contains approximately 159 liters. CHRISTIAN NGÔ &
JOSEPH B. NATOWITZ, OUR ENERGY FUTURE: RESOURCES, ALTERNATIVES, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 40 (2009).
82
“A unit of whole blood is 450 milliliters, which is about 0.9510 U.S. pint. For components of blood, one unit is the amount of that substance that would normally be found
in one unit of whole blood. The adult human body contains roughly 12 units of whole
blood.” Russ Rowlett, How Many? A Dictionary of Units of Measurement, UNIV. OF N.C.
AT CHAPEL HILL (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.unc.edu/~row lett/units/dictU.html.
83
See OIL-PRICE.NET, http://www.oil-price.net/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (charting
daily crude oil and commodity prices).
84
See STARR, supra note 6, at 207.
85
See Shaw, supra note 54, at A01.
79
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harvesting from individuals who should never have been permitted to
donate.86 Because the industry offered to pay for donations, it attracted
exactly the wrong populations: indigents, drug addicts, and prisoner
groups who faced a high risk of diseased blood because they tended to
have a higher number of sexual partners and engaged more often in drug
use through needles.87 The danger of acquiring contaminated product
skyrockets as soon as blood is collected from paid, rather than volunteer,
donors.88
Despite the FDA’s supposed authority over the industry, the blood
product distributors viewed it mainly as a puppet supervisor from the
1980s through the mid-1990s; a perception caused by the FDA’s lack of
direct policymaking power and its domination at the hands of the blood
industry.89 This weakness in regulation allowed the blood business to
operate with limited oversight, affording protection for the sellers rather
than the recipients of the blood products.90
Additionally, blood shield laws became increasingly common for both
the profit and non-profit industry, exempting suppliers of blood and blood
products from strict liability.91 This meant that, despite providing an incredibly risky product, the business did not need to worry about the possibility of many expensive lawsuits.92 The large donor population, the lax
supervision, and the diminished threat of litigation resulted in the United
States becoming the premier producer of blood and plasma products.93
b. Volunteer Versus Paid Donors
In 1974, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare published the
National Blood Policy, recommending that blood donations should be
86

STARR, supra note 6, at 208–10.
See id. at 210.
88
Pamela T. Westfall, Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption from Strict
Products Liability in California: A Reassessment, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1116 (1986).
89
Feldman, supra note 43, at 672; see also Salmaan Keshavjee, Sheri Weiser & Arthur Kleinman, Medicine Betrayed: Hemophilia Patients and HIV in the US, 53 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 1081, 1086 (2001) (describing hemophiliacs’ feelings of betrayal by the government for failing to provide adequate oversight, in part because of the “revolving door of
employment” that they believe existed between the FDA employees and the blood industry).
90
Feldman, supra note 43, at 672.
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See Dorney, supra note 19, at 169 (discussing the problems associated with blood
shield laws).
92
See Yi-Chen Su, Revisiting Factor VIII Cases: Is It Time for an Agency Adjudication System?, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 943, 947–48 (2008).
93
See STARR, supra note 6, at 208–10.
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collected only from volunteer donors.94 The plasma industry disregarded
this warning and continued to offer payment for plasma,95 creating an
incentive for people—even those who knew themselves to be at risk—to
continue selling.96 These products were utilized both domestically and
overseas.97
One scathing analysis of the blood business came from Richard
Titmuss, a respected scholar who studied the burgeoning trade of the new
commodity from the late 1960s through the 1970s.98 He believed that
monetary compensation for donations provided the wrong incentives: it
encouraged donors to hide their medical history, rather than revealing it.99
Titmuss’ conclusion on the system left little to commend the blood business:
[T]he commercialisation [sic] of blood and donor relationships represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers
scientific standards, limits both personal and professional freedoms,
sanctions the making of profits in hospitals and clinical laboratories, legalises [sic] hostility between doctor and patient, subjects critical areas
of medicine to the laws of the marketplace, places immense social costs
on those least able to bear them—the poor, the sick and the inept—
increases the danger of unethical behaviour [sic] in various sectors of
medical science and practice, and results in situations in which proportionally more and more blood is supplied by the poor, the unskilled, the
unemployed ... and other low income groups and categories of exploited human populations of high blood yielders. Redistribution ... of blood
and blood products from the poor to the rich appears to be one of the
dominant effects of the American blood-banking systems.100
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See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 9326, 9326–30 (Mar. 8, 1974).
Because plasmapheresis was a fairly uncomfortable procedure at the time, plasma
centers believed the additional incentive of payment was necessary to ensure adequate
supply. STARR, supra note 6, at 255.
96
See generally Harvey Sapolsky, AIDS, Blood Banking, and the Bonds of Community, 118 DAEDALUS 145, 145–63 (1989).
97
See, e.g., Kaneira, supra note 1; Shaw, supra note 54, at A01. For example, Canada
was unable to domestically process enough plasma to fulfill the country’s needs, so it was
forced to buy, and trust, American plasma products. See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 22.
98
See CATHERINE WALDBY & ROBERT MITCHELL, TISSUE ECONOMIES: BLOOD,
ORGANS, AND CELL LINES IN LATE CAPITALISM 10 (2006).
99
See generally RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., The New Press 1997).
But see Korsten, supra note 14, at 233–36 (providing a discussion of weaknesses in a
volunteer-only donation system).
100
TITMUSS, supra note 99, at 314.
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This study produced such an impact that Richard Nixon created the National Blood Policy, which promoted voluntary blood donations.101
By 1979, the risks of using paid donors were so well-known that victims of tainted blood already began bringing negligence lawsuits against
blood banks for failing to use a voluntary-donor system.102
c. Prisoners’ Blood and Plasma
Prisoners proved a perfect target for paid donations because the inmates desperately needed money, and plasma donations often brought
minimal compensation.103 More importantly for the industry, the prisoners
offered a stable, constant blood source that provided a steady stream of
product.104 In addition, prison plasma collection centers were automatically exempt from any real oversight, because plasma was considered a “vital
resource.”105 This classification meant that, under special short-supply
provisions governing such resources, drug companies were permitted to
“buy certain materials from unlicensed, uninspected vendors,”106 thus
providing no incentive for prisons to improve the health and safety conditions of their plasma programs.
As early as 1970, the dangers of using prisoners’ blood became public
knowledge. A 2009 British inquiry into contaminated blood states that:
“On 29 July 1969 the New York Times carried an article by Walter
Rugaber, entitled ‘Prison Drug and Plasma Projects Leave Fatal Trail.’ In
1970, the New York Times wrote of the ‘transfusion roulette’ played by
the blood industry.”107 By 1982, the FDA informally asked U.S. fractionators108 to stop purchasing blood donated by prison inmates109 for domestic
consumption because it was considered too risky. A disproportionate
101

Korsten, supra note 14, at 232.
See, e.g., Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200, 1202 (1979) (holding that
summary judgment was not appropriate when determining whether a blood bank acted
negligently by utilizing paid donors).
103
Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22.
104
STARR, supra note 6, at 210.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
INDEPENDENT PUBLIC INQUIRY REPORT ON NHS SUPPLIED CONTAMINATED BLOOD
AND BLOOD PRODUCTS 18 (2009), available at http://www.archercbbp.com/report.php
[hereinafter ARCHER INQUIRY].
108
KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 377 (“Although the Food and Drug
Administration used the language of requests and recommendations, its guidelines were
treated as mandatory.”).
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Id. at 372.
102

612

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:597

number of prisoners were infected with hepatitis C and HIV110 compared
to the free population,111 and prisoners proved more likely to engage in
high-risk sex and drug use, perpetuating the spread of these diseases.112
All of the fractionators complied with the FDA’s request.113
However, the FDA continued to license a few prison plasma centers
that were exporting the product, a practice that was still permitted.114 A
1984 information bulletin about prison plasma centers lists ongoing programs in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana,115 Tennessee, Nevada, and Missouri.116 Although in practice domestic prison sales ended in 1983,117 the
system has never been officially prohibited in the United States.118
d. The AIDS Comparison
Although hepatitis C does not inevitably result in death, as AIDS
does,119 there are certainly parallels between the victims of blood contaminated with AIDS and blood contaminated with hepatitis C. As with hepatitis C, scientists at first were not sure that AIDS passed through blood.120
It was not until 1982 that an FDA memorandum to manufacturers of blood
110

Whitney Hinkle, Giving Until It Hurts: Prisoners Are Not the Answer to the National Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593, 605–06 (2002) (“A study conducted by the
National Institute of Justice showed that the incidence rate of AIDS cases for the general
public was 14.65 cases per 100,000 people compared to 202 cases per 100,000 in federal
and state correctional facilities.”); see also Rueda, supra note 68, at 419 (“40% of our
country’s prisoners ... are afflicted by [hepatitis C].”).
111
See Hinkle, supra note 110, at 606.
112
See Picard & McIlroy, supra note 25, at A7.
113
KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 372.
114
Dennis Bueckert, Prisoners Donated Blood as Part of Rehabilitation, THE GLOBE
& MAIL (Canada), Feb. 12, 1999, at A6.
115
Prisoners at the Louisiana Department of Corrections at Angola actually brought
suit against the company running their plasma center in 1981, contending they were paid
below minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The plasma company, Sara, Inc. established the program in 1976 and paid the prisoners $3 per day and no
overtime. The court found that the prisoners were not employees of Sara, Inc., but rather
inmates who were not entitled to minimum wage. Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
42, 44 (M.D. La. 1983), aff’d, 721 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Lavigne v. Sara,
Inc., 424 So. 2d 273, 274 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
116
Suzi Parker, Dumping Scandal: The Export of Bad Blood, SALON.COM (Feb. 25,
1999), http://www.salon.com/1999/02/25/news_185/.
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KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 377. They also stopped using
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See Dorney, supra note 19, at 138.
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See id. at 140–41.
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products warned that: “Although the cause of the outbreak is unknown, the
information suggest[s] that a transmissible agent might be involved and
concern about transmission through blood and blood products has been
raised.”121
Two years later, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) informed those
in the business that blood transfusions “appear responsible for AIDS
among hemophilia patients,”122 and provided some preliminary measures
to reduce the spread of the disease.123 Unfortunately, as occurred later with
hepatitis C, a significant number of those in charge of blood banks took
little notice of these warnings and persisted in selling the blood without
implementing the recommended improvements.124 Many companies continued to export the unchecked blood overseas for more than a year after
the government finally established safety processes for domestic blood.125
As a result of the blood bankers’ inaction, more than 10,000 hemophiliacs and thousands of other blood transfusion recipients became infected
with the deadly HIV virus during the 1980s.126 The lawsuits resulting from
the AIDS scandal provide a relevant precedent for victims who contracted
hepatitis C, as many allegedly did following the Arkansas prison scandal.
II. THE ARKANSAS PRISON SCANDAL
A. What Happened? A History of the Prison
1. History
In 1970, the Arkansas District Court declared that certain practices at
the Cummins Prison in Grady, Arkansas, amounted to cruel and unusual

121

Deborah Tedford, Hemophiliacs Clash with Drug Companies; Suit: Firms Lax
with AIDS Tests in ‘80s, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1.
122
See Walt Bogdanich & Eric Koli, 2 Paths of Bayer Drug in 80’s: Riskier One
Steered Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A1.
123
INST. OF MED., HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY: AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS
DECISIONMAKING 101–06 (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr. & Michael A. Stoto
eds., 1995).
124
See Robert Steinbuch, The Executive-Internalization Approach to High-Risk Corporate Behavior: Establishing Individual Criminal Liability for the Intentional or Reckless Introduction of Excessively Dangerous Products or Services into the Stream of
Commerce, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 324 (2006–2007).
125
See id. at 325.
126
See, e.g., Harder, supra note 18; see also Michael McLeod, Bad Blood: Every Day,
a Hemophiliac Dies of AIDS; It Didn’t Have to Happen, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 19,
1993, at 10.
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punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.127 A
1969 description of the prisoners at Cummins by the court stated that:
Many of the inmates are psychopathic and sociopathic; some of them
are aggressive homosexuals. Many of the inmates are hardened criminals and some of them are extremely dangerous to society in general, to
their keepers, and to fellow inmates. Many of them are malingerers and
will go to any lengths to avoid work. Many are prone to destroy State
property, even items designed for their welfare and comfort.128

The court in Holt v. Sarver discussed the problems the prison administration faced, including its difficulties in keeping the inmates disciplined
and the administration’s lack of funding.129 Because Arkansas is one of the
rare states that refuses to pay its prisoners for their labor,130 the court noted: “The only legitimate way in which a convict at Cummins can earn
money is to sell blood to the prison blood bank.”131
By the time of the Arkansas blood scandal in the 1980s through the
1990s, the blood system was not the only problem plaguing the penitentiary.132 Accusations and investigations of murder, rape, bribery, embezzlement, and poor medical care were ongoing, and the state government
was working to end a system of bloated bonuses for the prison officials.133
Arkansas newspapers described the prison system as a “fiefdom” or a
“cartel” run by three prominent politicians: state Senator Knox Nelson of
Pine Bluff, state Representative William F. “Bill” Foster of England, and
Arkansas Department of Corrections Director A.L. “Art” Lockhart.134
All these internal problems meant that, as one former member of the
Arkansas Department of Corrections admitted: “We weren’t focused on
plasma.”135

127
See generally Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) [hereinafter Holt
II], aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
128
Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 829–30 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I].
129
See id. at 830.
130
See Mara Leveritt, Bloody Awful: How Money and Politics Contaminated Arkansas’s Prison Plasma Program, ARK. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007 (Top Stories), available at
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/bloody-awful/Content?oid=863387.
131
Holt I, 300 F. Supp. at 829.
132
See Leveritt, supra note 130.
133
Id.
134
Id. At the time, there were claims that those in charge, and their friends, were illegally profiting from the prison. Id.
135
Id.
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2. The Prison Plasma System
The Arkansas Prison Blood and Plasma Center existed at the Cummins
Unit Infirmary at the Cummins prison in Grady, Arkansas, from 1963
through 1994.136 Authorities decided to allow prisoners to donate blood
and plasma to rehabilitate themselves and for business purposes; this
method provided an assured group of donors who would donate on a regular basis and whose blood product could be picked up from one central
location.137 Prisoners were paid $7 per donation138—“like ‘little cows,’”
one government official commented later139—and the prison system sold
this same unit for more than $100.140
Official estimates state that the Arkansas prisons produced from 300 to
500 units of blood every weekend.141 A large portion of the plasma collected from the blood was utilized to create Factor VIII.142 When the units
were being collected during the 1980s, no test for hepatitis C or
HIV/AIDS existed.143
B. Where Did the Tainted Blood Go?
In 1978, Health Management Associates (HMA), a private company,
was given authority to run both the medical and plasma programs at
Cummins Prison.144 Cutter Laboratories, one of the major American blood
product manufacturers, bought plasma from the Arkansas prisons from the
1960s to 1982—the year U.S. companies stopped purchasing prison
blood.145 An internal memo from Cutter Laboratories illustrates the attitude towards the risks of prison blood at the time:
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FACTOR 8, supra note 29.
See Bueckert, supra note 114, at A6.
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Take no extraordinary actions. There are no data to support the emotional arguments that prison plasma collected from adequately screened
prisoners is ‘bad.’ To exclude such plasma from manufacturer of our
coagulation product would only be a sop or gratuity to the Gay Rights
... and would presage further pressure to exclude plasma collected from
the Mexican border and the paid donor.146

Because of the warnings against the use of prison blood in transfusions
within the U.S. after 1982,147 the prison system decided to ship the blood
abroad instead.148 The blood was sold to a Montreal company, Continental
Pharma Cryno149 (the biggest blood broker in Canada), which then sold to
Switzerland, Spain, Japan, Italy, and Toronto-based Connaught Laboratories,150 who subsequently distributed it to the Canadian Red Cross. In at
least one case, the blood was sent back to the United States.151
After HMA was cited in 1983 for health and safety violations, it created a subsidiary called Arkansas Blood Components Inc. (ABC Plasma),152
under which it continued to sell the blood.153 ABC Plasma remained on
Connaught’s list of approved suppliers in March of 1984.154
In 1986, for reasons explained further below, HMA’s contract ended,
but the plasma center continued operation under two different organizations (which followed HMA’s distribution patterns),155 until the program
ended in 1994.156
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(Kitchener-Waterloo), Nov. 21, 2003, at D15.
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CITIZEN, May 25, 1999, at A3.
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C. What Were the Conditions of the Plasma Program?
Inmates interviewed for a documentary on the prison-blood scandal,
Factor 8,157 claimed that the prisoners themselves ran the plasma program,
resulting in overbleeding,158 bleeding disqualified donors,159 unsafe conditions for the donations generally,160 and the destruction and falsification of
records and evidence.161 Multiple witnesses to the events claimed that the
plasma center accepted some donations from prisoners known to fail the
required qualifications.162 A previous inmate, Lewis Sorrells, described
the conditions at the prison: “You had prisoners bribing prisoners, prisoners bribing officials, officials offering certain deals for them to bleed for
extra money or drugs.”163 Sorrells himself passed away from hepatitis C
shortly after the interview; he became infected with the disease during his
time at Cummins prison.164
The Canadian Hemophilia Society claims that the plasma administrators allowed some inmates to bleed even after being diagnosed with hepatitis C, and permitted some to donate as often as sixty times per year.165
During FDA investigations, officials documented numerous violations,
including the use of dirty needles (which resulted in inmates infecting
each other), and a hepatitis B testing laboratory out of commission for two

157
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months while blood collection continued.166 The prison plasma system
was shut down three times because of safety violations, but it was allowed
to reopen each time.167
1. The Recalls
The largest crisis at the plasma center occurred in 1983, when the FDA
recalled thirty-eight blood units after it found that twelve inmates,168 ineligible and likely infected with hepatitis, had donated.169 Unfortunately, the
recall came too late to retrieve all of the tainted blood170—almost 4,000
vials had already been exported.171
It was during this emergency that Canada first learned that it was importing inmate plasma.172 Before this time, there were no obvious indications that the plasma came from a prison; the labels on the product simply
noted the source as “ADC Plasma Center, Grady, Arkansas.”173 An FDA
inspection report in Connaught’s possession stated the plasma’s true
source, but no one at Connaught ever bothered to read the information.174
A second recall occurred one month after the first, causing the Canadian Red Cross to cancel its contract with Connaught.175 In the letter of
termination, the assistant national director of blood transfusion stated that
recent crises left the Canadian Red Cross “with no confidence in the quality and safety of the material.”176
After these incidents, the FDA shut down the prison center for over a
year177 and revoked its license178 in February 1984.179 The violations
166
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found by the FDA included allowing disqualified donors to continue donating, altering records, and improperly storing the collected plasma.180
HMA was sued over the first recall, and paid $250,000 to settle its share of
the liability.181
2. Response
Perhaps in part because of these events, the FDA issued a national
warning that inmates have a higher chance of being infected with HIV
than the general population182—a caution to which the National Correctional Association responded quickly.183 Those responsible for running the
Cummins Plasma Program chose to disregard these communications and
succeeded in reopening the program.184 Their intentional blindness persisted even as HMA’s insurance agency refused to continue its coverage.185
Responding to the FDA’s warnings, the Arkansas Department of Corrections requested a report of HMA’s program by the Institute for Law and
Policy Planning of Berkeley, California (ILPP).186 The response proved
scathing: the ILPP identified forty areas where HMA completely failed to
meet the requirements of its contract with the ADC.187 Even worse, HMA
also violated general professional standards, as it “hired a large number of
unlicensed, uncertified or legally unqualified medical staff” who were not
properly supervised.188 The final analysis concluded that: “For HMA, all
this must be viewed as profit-motivated business decision making, at best.
178
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180
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At worst, it calls for further inquiry.”189 ILPP’s sharp words finally penetrated the ADC, and in 1986, HMA lost its contract with Cummins prison.190
3. After HMA
However, the plasma center did not end with HMA; Pine Bluff
Biologicals (PBBP) took over and expanded it.191 The new oversight provided little improvement, however, as an FDA inspector soon found that
the center possessed inadequate screening measures and recordkeeping.192
In addition, those in charge of the program were accused of using security
officers to “recruit” inmates to donate plasma.193 The prison medical director, John Byus, explained the business plan to a local reporter, stating:
“We plan to stick with [the plasma program] to the last day .... [t]o the last
drop we’re able to sell.”194
A New York group took over the plasma center in 1991, and it continued to produce and distribute prison plasma until 1994.195 In 1999, Dina
Tyler, the spokeswoman for Arkansas prisons, admitted that, “some inmates were allowed to take part in the program who should not have
been.”196 She claimed a single clerk caused the errors, and that he charged
inmates a fee to recertify them for donations.197
D. How Much Was the Arkansas Plasma Center Worth?
It was well known in Arkansas that the ADC profited from the plasma
program;198 the question is, by how much?
The total profits will probably never be accurately known, because before the tainted blood scandal occurred, the Arkansas legislature passed a
189
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law declaring that the blood plasma program did not need to report its
earnings to the Arkansas legislature.199 According to vague records from
the Department of Finance and Administration, from 1982 to 1986 the
ADC earned $31,721 to $167,259 per year from the plasma program.200
Records recovered from 1986 provide slightly more insight into the
potential income of the ADC and the organization running the program:
by then, Pine Bluff Biological ran the clinic, and it reported collecting
about 960 units of plasma every week.201 At the time, a unit of plasma was
worth at least $50 to an international blood broker.202
Based on these numbers, a conservative estimate of PBBP’s gross
sales for that fiscal year would come out to $2.5 million.203 PBBP’s contract promised the ADC $5 per unit of plasma collected.204 The resulting
breakdown may have occurred: “Of PBBP’s $2.5 million in annual gross
sales, $350,000 went to pay inmates their $7-per-unit fees.205 The state of
Arkansas collected $249,600 for prison operations. PBBP had gross revenues of $1,896,969.”206 Calculating for inflation, that profit would translate to approximately $3,923,143 in March 2012.207
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III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
A. Canada
1. What Happened to the Tainted Blood in Canada?
Canada stopped using plasma from its own prison inmates in 1971,208
based on the recommendation of the Red Cross, because of hepatitis concerns.209 In 1982, however, when HMA was searching for a new, foreign
buyer, Canada represented one of the few countries in the world that continued to allow the import of prisoner’s blood and plasma.210
The consequences of that practice proved dire. It is estimated that over
1,000 Canadian hemophiliacs were provided with tainted plasma from the
Cummins prison.211 At least 42,000 Canadians have been infected with
hepatitis C, and thousands more with the HIV virus, due to tainted plasma,
some imported from the Cummins prison.212 It is estimated that more than
7,000 Canadians will die from the contaminated blood.213
As a result of this scandal, the Canadian Red Cross declared bankruptcy and was removed from the direct collection of blood.214 Further, Canadian authorities launched the Krever Commission (the Commission) in
1995 to trace the trail of the tainted blood.215 The Commission was the
first to publicize the likelihood that the Canadian blood supply was contaminated by blood donated by U.S. prisoners.216
The Commission report found that the distribution of the tainted blood
could have been avoided if better management and oversight had been in
place.217 The report noted that Connaught Laboratories bought exported
plasma only because the domestic supply was so small that importing
blood and plasma became necessary.218 In addition, the report implied that
Connaught was negligent; it determined that “Connaught decided it was
208

KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 372.
See DePalma, supra note 24, at A4.
210
See Michele Mandel, Bad Blood: A New Novel Probes Bill Clinton’s Possible Role
in Canada’s Red Cross Scandal, THE TORONTO SUN, Oct. 4, 1998, at 30.
211
See Bueckert, supra note 162.
212
See Parker, supra note 155.
213
See id.
214
DePalma, supra note 24, at A4.
215
Tainted Blood: Poison from the Prisons, supra note 151.
216
See McKenna, supra note 34, at A16.
217
See Anne McIlroy, U.S. Prisoners’ Blood Fed Hep-C Infections: Ottawa Documents Show for the First Time That Government Knew About Risk of Supply, THE GLOBE
& MAIL (Canada), June 30, 1999, at A1.
218
See id.
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‘impracticable’ to inspect all the plasma-collection sites itself, and decided
to rely instead on FDA reports which it did not, in fact, review.”219 The
Bureau of Biologics (the Bureau), Canada’s counterpart to the FDA, only
required that the FDA license the plasma centers.220 Connaught provided
the Bureau with their list of FDA-approved collection sites, and neither
party inquired further.221 One Connaught official stated it best during a
hearing for the Krever Commission when he commented: “Obviously the
system broke down.”222
A 1998 Canadian Health Department memo explains that the use of
the prison blood continued in Canada because the Canadian broker (Continental-Pharma) was never informed that the blood had a “high probability” of being infected with HIV and hepatitis C.223 The memo stated that:
The use of these blood products in Canada can be attributed to a failure
by U.S. blood and regulatory authorities to inform a Canadian blood
broker that blood collected at prisons was no longer safe and as a result
was no longer being used in the U.S. ....
... At the time, these blood centres [sic] were still licensed by the U.S.
Food and Drugs [sic] Administration ... but blood coming from them
for the most part was exported.224

Unfortunately, it was not illegal to sell prison blood in the U.S., although
in practice it no longer occurred.225 Therefore, when Connaught inquired
about the matter in 1983, it was told only that no regulations on the matter
existed, not that the U.S. fractionators, in consultation with the FDA, ended the practice226 the year before.227
In 1999, The Globe and Mail, under access-to-information legislation,
obtained a briefing note written by Health Minister Allan Rock that suggested the Arkansas prison blood was responsible for at least some Canadians becoming infected with hepatitis C. The document explained:
“Plasma from such high-risk populations may indeed have contributed to
the transmission of blood diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis C.”228
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See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 377.
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Id. at 398.
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See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
228
McIlroy, supra note 217, at A1.
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In 2001, documents from Health Canada, the company responsible for
running the country’s health system, proved that the Canadian Red Cross
did distribute plasma from U.S. prison inmates.229 The documents admitted that “risky” blood from the Arkansas prison was used and that “a significant amount of the product made from the potentially HIV-infected
blood was not retrieved and it was learned that it had already been
used.”230 Evidence brought to light in 2003 showed that the Arkansas
prison continued to sell—and Canada continued to receive—the inmates’
blood long after the prison had been cited for multiple safety and health
violations, including approving donors who were infected with HIV and
hepatitis C.231
The Canadian government settled a class action lawsuit brought by
Canadian hemophiliacs for $1.118 billion in 1999.232 This settlement only
covered those infected between 1986 and 1990.233 The group, led by plaintiff Michael McCarthy, vice president of the Canadian Hemophilia Society, also filed a suit against Continental Pharma.234
In 1999, a group of Canadian hemophiliacs declared their intent to sue
the responsible parties in America for $5 billion.235 In 2001, the Canadian
Hemophilia Society announced further plans: they hoped to sue Arkansas,
Louisiana, the businesses that participated in the sale and export of prison
plasma, and the FDA.236 The two companies they planned to name in the
lawsuit were Health Management Associates in Arkansas and Community
Plasma Center in Louisiana.237
Despite the announcement, the lawsuit was never filed.238 McCarthy,
also piloting this effort, reported that “numerous obstacles ... delayed the
filing—including the inability to get legal help from respected blood litigators south of the [U.S.-Canadian] border.”239
As of 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had been investigating the blood scandal for five years, and despite supposedly con229

See Harder, supra note 18.
See id.
231
See Canadian Press, supra note 153, at D15; see also discussion supra Part II.B.
232
See Canada Proposes $1.1 Billion Settlement in HCV Lawsuit, REUTERS HEALTH
MEDICAL NEWS, June 18, 1999 (Legal) [hereinafter Canada Proposes $1.1 Billion Settlement].
233
See id.
234
See id.
235
Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1.
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See Harder, supra note 18.
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See Canada Proposes $1.1 Billion Settlement, supra note 232.
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See Harder, supra note 18.
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templating charging those in the United States with criminal negligence,240
the only charges filed thus far have been against the Red Cross and the
Federal Bureau of Biologics.241 One of the factors the probe is focused on
is “the importation of tainted blood from prisoners in Arkansas, brought
into Canada by a Montreal-based blood broker and used by Canadian
hemophiliacs. The same tainted blood product was exported around the
world by the Canadian broker.”242
2. Canadian Response
In 2006, the Canadian government finally compensated victims of
Canada’s tainted blood scandal who contracted hepatitis C and were not
included in previous settlements, including those claiming to have been
infected by plasma from Cummins prison.243 More than 5,000 victims who
were given contaminated blood and blood products before 1986 and after
1990 will receive compensation under the plan.244 The previous settlement
in 1998 only included those infected between 1986 and 1990, because the
government claimed it could not have prevented contamination before
1986; however, evidence of screening techniques introduced prior to 1986
weakened the government’s position.245
Under the new agreement, the government set aside nearly $1 billion
to provide compensation, thus matching the compensation for those infected between 1986 and 1990.246 Further, those who contracted the disease through tainted blood before 1986 and after 1990 will now receive
between $1,000 and $300,000.247

240

Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1.
See Laura Cudworth, Stuff Movies Are Made of: Tainted Blood Scandal to Be
Turned into Film, STRATFORD BEACON-HERALD (Ontario), Jan. 18, 2006, at 1.
242
Tim Harper, Criminal Charges Likely End to Tainted Blood Probe, HAMILTON
SPECTATOR (Ontario), Nov. 15, 1999, at C14.
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See Op-Ed., Long Time Coming, THE SIMCOE REFORMER (Ontario), Aug. 2, 2006,
at 4.
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See id.
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See id.
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B. Britain
1. What Happened to the Tainted Blood in Britain?
Britain outlawed paid donations of blood earlier than the United States
because the British government believed that paying would attract the
wrong type of donor.248 Britain also did not permit collection of prisoners’
blood, both because the government considered it exploitive and because
it recognized earlier than the United States that such blood was more likely to be contaminated.249 However, Britain, like Canada, continued to
purchase blood from international vendors, like the United States, 250 and
this allowed tainted blood to poison thousands of British citizens.251 Tainted blood that was sold to Britain in the 1980s—including blood products
from the Arkansas prisons—resulted in what Lord Robert Winston called
“the worst treatment disaster in the history of the NHS.”252 Most of the
victims believed the blood and clotting factors they were using came from
British donors; the possibility the blood might have been imported did not
even occur to them, much less the prospect that it might not meet British
health standards.253
This disaster left 4,670 British hemophiliacs infected with hepatitis C,
and 1,243 of those were also infected with HIV.254 Nearly 2,000 have
died, and many more need treatment.255 The diseases have continued to
spread to partners and children.256 The outcry surrounding this tragedy
resulted in a two-year private report, the Archer Inquiry (the Inquiry),257
released in February 2009. The Inquiry found that “Britain was slow to

248

See Birrell, supra note 32.
See Leveritt, supra note 130.
250
See ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 24 (describing the negotiations between
British pharmacists and commercial suppliers—primarily American suppliers).
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See Birrell, supra note 32.
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Id.
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See Leveritt, supra note 130.
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See Birrell, supra note 32.
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See ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 5.
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See Birrell, supra note 32.
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The Independent Public Inquiry on NHS Supplied Contaminated Blood and Blood
Products. This independent inquiry was not financed in any way by the English government. ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 6–7. Its mission statement is: “To investigate
the circumstances surrounding the supply to patients of contaminated NHS blood and
blood products; its consequences for the haemophilia [sic] community and others afflicted; and suggest further steps to address both their problems and needs and those of bereaved families.” Id. at 7.
249
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react to the problems as they emerged[,] and said commercial interests
were put ahead of safety.”258 It ultimately determined that:
[A] significant burden of responsibility [for tainted blood provided to
British hemophiliacs] rests on American suppliers of Factor VIII concentrate. Long after alarms had been sounded about the risks of obtaining paid-for blood donations from communities with an increased incidence of relevant infections, such as prison inmates, this practice
continued. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that commercial interests took precedence over public health concerns.259

Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly where all the blood
came from, and how much of it might have come from the United States
or the Arkansas prison. A significant part of this uncertainty stems from
the fact that during the 1990s many of the records keeping track of the
imports and sales of blood were shredded.260 The British Haemophilia
Society has sought an inquiry into the plasma transactions, specifically for
the Factor VIII sent from the Arkansas prisons, but their requests have yet
to be addressed.261 According to the Communications Manager of the
Hemophiliac Society, “[w]e know of three UK cases of HIV that can be
directly traced back to Arkansas prison blood.”262 By October 2010, an
estimated 1,800 out of the 4,800 British hemophiliacs poisoned by tainted
blood products had died,263 and this number certainly increased over the
past two years.
2. English Response
The English government has been struggling to come to a settlement
for the sufferers of contaminated blood and blood products. In October
2010, however, the government decided that, given spending costs and the
current financial crisis, it would be too expensive to offer a compensation
package similar to that of Ireland, where those infected with hepatitis C
were each given £750,000 after a similar inquiry in 1991.264 Instead, it
258
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ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 105.
260
The British Department of Health ordered an inquiry into the destruction of the
documents in 2000, but failed to publish its findings. When reporters from the BBC
requested the findings in 2007, they were informed that the Prime Minister ordered them
withheld. See Leveritt, supra note 130.
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See id.
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14 Oct. 2010, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2010) 555 (U.K.).
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See generally id. at 521.
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offered only to provide a “rapid, but limited, review into the cases of those
infected with hepatitis C.”265
3. Scottish Response
In Glasgow, hemophiliacs who believe they were infected by the Arkansas prison plasma have repeatedly asked for a public inquiry into the
matter.266 The hemophiliacs believe that the inmates were allowed to continue donating even though authorities knew they were infected with hepatitis C and HIV. They have even threatened to call former President Bill
Clinton, Governor of Arkansas at the time of the scandal, to the witness
stand.267
According to the Public Health Minister, victims have received compensation of up to £45,000, and therefore a public inquiry would not provide “any real benefit.”268 The hemophiliacs have already taken legal
action against the Lord Advocate and the Health Minister.269
IV. THE LAWSUIT
A. Why Did the Victims Fail to File Suit Against the Responsible American
Parties?
1. In General
No clear answer exists as to why the victims of the Arkansas prison
plasma scandal failed to sue the allegedly responsible parties, especially
because the Canadian Hemophilia Society planned to do so as early as
1999.270 As of that date, the Canadian victims also stated their desire to
“seek a full investigation by the U.S. [J]ustice [D]epartment to determine
265

Birrell, supra note 32.
See Matt Dickinson, Infected Blood Victims Protest at Clinton Visit; Transfusions
Came from Former President’s Home State, EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS (Scotland), May 11,
2006, at 13.
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Clinton’s Scottish Court Warning, DAILY RECORD (Scotland), Oct. 31, 2005, at 21.
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Dickinson, supra note 266, at 13.
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See Clinton’s Scottish Court Warning, supra note 267.
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Tim Harper, Tainted Blood Victims Seek U.S. Retribution, THE TORONTO STAR,
Feb. 22, 1999 (News) (“The Canadian hemophiliacs ... plan to seek American retribution
for the tainted blood collected from U.S. prisoners and exported to [Canada]. They will
launch a lawsuit against the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the state of
Arkansas, and possibly Clinton, the Arkansas governor while Health Management Associates collected plasma from inmates of Cummins Prison.”). Id. The RCMP supposedly
began talks with the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department. Id.
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how inmates ... continued to give dirty blood which was exported to Canada and then to other countries.”271
Victims in Britain felt angry enough to search through the records on
their own until they determined that they did receive plasma from the
Cummins prison.272 In Canada, victims threatened to subpoena prominent
government officials to explain their actions.273
So why did such a suit never materialize? The unfortunate truth is
probably because the United States courts have demonstrated a general
distaste for finding liability for contaminated blood defendants, and often
dismiss the cases on summary judgment.274 Courts have been especially
reluctant to find liability in cases where hepatitis C was the transmitted
disease for two major reasons: “(1) the judicial fear that to impose such
liability would severely restrict the availability of blood, and (2) the absence of any reliable way to detect hepatitis-carrying blood.”275
In addition to this initial reluctance, the plaintiffs would face basic
procedural limitations.276 Precedent cases show that it has been historically
difficult to procure a class action certification approved for groups of
hemophiliacs suing the blood industry.277 Moreover, forty-eight out of

271

Id. The victims also believed they had the legal standing to do so. As the foreign
affairs spokesperson announced: “Canadians are free to pursue alleged wrongs perpetrated by foreign governments.” Id.
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See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 F.2d 437, 438–39 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
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37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1 (1984).
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Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., No. Civ. A. 94-0382, 2000 WL 282787, at *7 (E.D. La.
Mar. 14, 2000).
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extent in Canada; a class action suit filed against the Canadian Red Cross and the Canadian Government by about 1,000 hemophiliacs infected with HIV was thrown out because the judge determined that, “lawsuits involving contaminated blood should be filed
individually.” Canada Drops Blood Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 3. However,
some courts have allowed consolidation and centralization of claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (meaning that claims with similar bases in fact can be tried at a central location
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tried together). See, e.g., In re “Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods.” Prods. Liab.
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fifty states278 have passed blood shield laws,279 limiting the available causes of action against those in the industry.280
B. Hypothetical Negligence Case
1. The Hypothetical
If the Canadian Hemophilia Society had brought suit against HMA
and Pine Bluff Biologicals,281 like most of the plaintiffs in the tainted
blood litigation thus far in the United States, the victims of the Arkansas
blood scandal probably would not have prevailed,282 even if all the facts
alleged were true,283 and even though the distributed blood products were
not “unavoidably unsafe.”284
This is the unfortunate reality even when considering the horrific conditions purported to exist at the prison plasma center. At any plasma center
during this period, it is possible that a few cases of blood tainted with
hepatitis C were inevitable, especially given the fact that the causative
agent of the disease was not known at the time,285 and that no accurate test
to identify it existed.286 But the situation at the Cummins plasma center
was not inevitable. The fact that the disease infecting the recipients was

278

Including Arkansas. McKenna, supra note 34, at A16.
Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1.
280
Id. (“An American group seeking compensation for contracting HIV and hepatitis
C from tainted blood has had no success in seven years of court action.”).
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See Mandel, supra note 210, at 30. The Krever Commission Report at least confirms that the basic facts of the Cummins Plasma Program and the distribution of the
blood products to Canada are correct. Id.
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See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). The concept of “unavoidably unsafe” is addressed in § 402A comment k, which provides an exception to
strict liability for products deemed to meet the standard of “products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use.” Id. The blood products here were not “avoidably unsafe” because, under
the state of human knowledge at the time, it was well known that the use of prisoners’
blood and the unsanitary conditions at Cummins prison made contamination more likely,
but the plasma was distributed anyway.
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See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 2 (1984) (identifying hepatitis C only as
“non-A, non-B”).
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Dorney, supra note 19, at 169 (noting that even the best hepatitis C tests were only
twenty-five to thirty percent effective).
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unknown and unpreventable at the time287 does not change the truth: those
in charge of monitoring the program either knew or should have known
that the conditions at the prison provided a breeding ground for diseased
product. They were aware of the warnings from the FDA against using
prisoners’ blood and of an established industry custom against using plasma from paid donors, but they disregarded these red flags and distributed
it anyway,288 causing the spread of needless disease and death in order to
secure a profit.289
Despite this apparent negligence, despite the findings of the Krever
Commission, and despite the responses of the Canadian and British governments showing that it is likely that this tainted plasma was distributed
to and sickened their populations, a legal remedy for victims in this matter
could not be easily obtained. Due to the extreme difficulty of proving
causation in a tainted blood product case,290 unless the plaintiffs could
prove that a vial of tainted blood from Cummins prison directly caused
their hepatitis C, a negligence suit against the responsible parties would
fail,291 given the current state of litigation against the blood industry in
America.292
2. Why Negligence?
Why bring a negligence suit then, if it is likely to fail? The explanation
is that plaintiffs have a slightly higher chance of prevailing in a negligence
action against a blood product supplier than they do in winning a strict
liability293 or breach of implied warranty294 action.295 Negligence is effec287
But see Westfall, supra note 88, at 1123 (arguing that the risk of blood products
should not have been inevitable because it could have been reduced by decreasing the
pooling and ending the use of high-risk donors).
288
See discussion supra Part II.C.
289
See discussion supra Part II.D.
290
See Miller, supra note 31, at 473.
291
See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (2000) (“Negligence claims for
blood products ... were practically impossible for plaintiffs to win.”).
292
See Rueda, supra note 68, at 424 (explaining that plaintiffs in tainted blood litigation have a very small chance of prevailing).
293
Strict liability is a tort theory that allows a plaintiff to recover for damages caused
by a defective product, even if the seller of the product took all reasonable precautions in
manufacturing the product. This cause of action is codified in § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. See Miller, supra note 31, at 482–83. Very few cases have allowed
strict liability in blood-supply cases, and then only when the court determined that the
blood created an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See, e.g., DeBattista v. ArgonautSouthwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26, 32 (La. 1981).

632

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:597

tively the only possible cause of action against blood product producers
because of the enactment of blood shield laws across the United States.296
As one author described the current legal climate:
Today, the provider of a virally contaminated unit of whole blood,
blood component, or blood derivative bears virtually no liability to the
injured recipient of the transfusion. First, the transfusion of blood products is not the sale of goods; therefore, the implied warranties of Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) do not attach. Second, barring negligence, blood products that are virally contaminated are not
legally defective and unreasonably dangerous, thereby avoiding any
provider liability under a theory of strict liability in tort. This unique
legal protection of blood products and providers arises by operation of
law as stated in each state’s blood shield statute.297

Blood shield laws in the United States codify the rule that blood and
blood derivatives are not considered “products” under strict products liability298 and implied warranty, mainly out of concern that the risks cannot
be completely eradicated when there are so many possibilities for contamination.299 Thus, rather than simply asserting a strict liability or breach of
implied warranty cause of action,300 a tainted blood or plasma victim must
face the higher burden of proving the elements of a negligence claim to

294

Implied warranty is a contract theory defined and controlled by the Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 2. See Miller, supra note 31, at 482. Though causes of action
for breach of implied warranty generally fail, they have occasionally been successful if
the state’s blood shield statute provided an exception. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 393702 (West 2011) (restrictions on liability do not apply to suppliers who use paid donors
or who profit); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 2011) (restrictions on liability
do not apply if the donor was paid); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 (West 2009) (restrictions on liability do not apply to a hospital if blood came from a source in which the
hospital held a financial interest).
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See Conk, supra note 291, at 1094.
296
See, e.g., Miles Labs. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1125 (Md. 1989) (effectively holding that only a negligence cause of action could be brought against the defendant blood
bank).
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Shu-Acquaye & Innet, supra note 58, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
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See Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding
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See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 295 (2000).
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See id. (“To establish negligence, plaintiffs must show that the defendants either
knew or should have known of the risk of transmitting a deadly virus through the sale of
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prevail, because legislatures and courts have both decided to prohibit or
strongly limit the application of no-fault liability in these situations.301
Under the burden of negligence, the plaintiffs would need to show that
the injury they suffered resulted because HMA and Pine Bluff Biologicals
failed to use reasonable care in their collection and distribution of the
blood products, and that this failure caused the victims to contract the
disease.302
3. Arkansas’ Blood Shield Law
Arkansas’ blood shield law is codified in section 20-9-802 of the Arkansas Code. It only permits negligence and willful misconduct causes of
action against those involved in the manufacture, sale and transfer of
blood or blood products,303 stating:
No physician, surgeon, hospital, blood bank, tissue bank, or other person or entity who donates, obtains, prepares, transplants, injects, transfuses, or otherwise transfers or who assists or participates in obtaining,
preparing, transplanting, injecting, transfusing, or transferring any tissue, organ, blood, or component thereof from one (1) or more human
beings, living or dead, to another human being, shall be liable as the result of the activity, except that each such person or entity shall remain
liable for negligence or willful misconduct only.304

Section 20-9-801 clarifies the public policy reasons behind the blood
shield statute, explaining that this shield is necessary to ensure the availability of scientific knowledge and that, by preventing strict liability causes
of action (which might inhibit such development), the State is better able
to promote the health and welfare of its citizens.305 In addition, Arkansas
law precludes actions under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
for breach of warranty in cases of blood services.306
301
See Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to “No Cause” Liability in Blood
Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 117 (1995).
302
See Feldman, supra note 43, at 671. This is discussed in a preliminary version of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which states: “A seller of human blood products or
human tissue is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by product defects [only]
if, at the time of sale, the seller failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining, processing
or selling the blood product or tissue.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 4B (Preliminary Draft No. 2 1994).
303
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-802 (West 2010).
304
Id.
305
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-801.
306
See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The implied
warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code therefore do not apply to blood ....”).
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4. Establishing the Elements
In order to prove negligence, the plaintiffs would need to show: (1)
that they were owed a legal duty by the responsible parties, (2) that such
duty was breached, (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of their
injury, and (4) that they suffered damage.307
a. Duty
The first concern that the plaintiffs in such a case would need to prove
is that those responsible for the conditions at the plasma center owed them
a duty308 of care.309 The victims would have to address who, precisely,
owed them a duty. Given HMA’s dissolution in 1986, it would make the
most sense for the plaintiffs to sue those in charge of HMA and Pine Bluff
Biologicals310 as individuals311 if they hoped to achieve a monetary victory.312
The contract between PBBP and the ADC provided that, for the
ADC’s portion of the earnings, PBBP could use the plasma center and any
utilities without cost, and could have access to inmates for donations and
occasional staffing of the center.313 In exchange, PBBP promised to “assume responsibility/liability for all plasma product(s) produced.”314 It is
likely that a similar contract bound the ADC and HMA.315
Based on legal precedent, it is clearly true that blood product distributors owe a duty of care to the recipients of the blood product.316 This duty,
307

Endres v. Endres, 968 A.2d 336, 340 (Vt. 2008).
See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (5th ed.
1984) (“‘[D]uty’ is ... an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
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309
37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 5 (1984).
310
This is based on the assumption that these defendants are under the jurisdiction of
the court. Constitutionally, the plaintiffs cannot sue the state of Arkansas or the Arkansas
Board of Corrections without the state consenting, because “the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their
agencies.” Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (holding that a federal court’s injunction against the Alabama Board of Corrections was unconstitutional).
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For the purposes of this Note, these individuals will continue to be collectively referred to as HMA.
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Though it would probably be more of a moral victory than a monetary victory, as it
is unlikely that individual defendants could provide much compensation.
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Leveritt, supra note 130.
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Id.
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No evidence was available to confirm or deny this, so for the purposes of the hypothetical, it will be assumed true.
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Dorney, supra note 19, at 157.
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stated generally, is to collect the commodity in a non-negligent manner.317
“Non-negligent manner” means that the defendant did not and should not
have foreseen that his actions might harm another.318 A major part of this
determination is a court’s inquiry into what was or should have been
known by the scientific community and the blood industry at the time.319
Courts differ in the standard of care they believe the blood industry
should adhere to: the ordinary standard or the professional standard.320 On
one side, industry proponents contend that blood and plasma centers are
service providers selling an inherently dangerous product. They argue,
therefore, that the producers should be held to a professional standard, out
of concern that the industry will otherwise suffer, because no one will
want to work in it and face such a high likelihood of liability. A New Jersey Court of Appeals, meanwhile, clearly explained the opposing side’s
position, stating:
[I]f the blood bank industry is allowed to establish its own custom or
practice of testing for the presence of an infectious disease, then no
matter how unreasonable such standard might be by ordinary judgment,
all members of the blood bank industry would be insulated from liability as long as they conformed their practice to the industry’s selfestablished norm. This result is not tolerable in our system of justice.321

Even now, jurisdictions are greatly divided on this question.322 For example, the court in Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services found that, as
317

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. b (1965).
319
Dana J. Finberg, Note, Blood Bank and Blood Products Manufacturer Liability in
Transfusion-Related AIDS Cases, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 534 (1992).
320
If held to a professional standard of care, the plaintiffs in this case must prove that
the conditions that HMA and PBBP allowed in the prison did not meet the contemporary
industry-wide custom. See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101,
120–21 (Ct. App. 1992). Professional standards in this context would include: “[S]tatutes,
such as blood bank acts and communicable disease acts; regulations, such as those of the
Food and Drug Administration; licensure examination requirements; internal rules, bylaws and regulations of organizations, such as the AABB; professional publications and
learned treatises; conduct or standards of like organizations; and expert testimony.” R. Jo
Reser & Barbara A. Radnofsky, New Wave of Tainted Blood Litigation: Hepatitis C
Liability Issues, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 306, 309 (2000).
321
Estate of Elkerson v. N.J. Blood Ctr., 776 A.2d 244, 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
322
For a comprehensive discussion of industry versus a general standard of care and
its implications for jury considerations, see generally Reser & Radnofsky, supra note
320, at 307–08 (“While compliance with industry standards has not allowed defendants
an out in litigation, the failure to comply with such standards usually proves fatal.”).
318
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a service provider, the Red Cross should be held to a professional standard;323 however, in an Arkansas case, Kirkendall v. Harbor Insurance
Company, the court determined that complying with industry standards
could be evidence of what ought to be done, but that it was not conclusive.324 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that meeting industry
standard was permitted as evidence of non-negligence, but found that the
plaintiff must be given the opportunity to prove the standards of the entire
industry negligent.325
Given the Eighth Circuit court’s decision in Kirkendall, it is likely that
the court would hold HMA and PBBP to the ordinary standard of care;
however, as discussed below, the plasma center administrators’ negligence
was great enough to breach either standard. In conclusion, it is clear that
HMA and PBBP owed the recipients of the plasma a duty of care, whether
ordinary or professional.
b. Breach
In order to breach their duty, the defendants in this case would need to
have failed to meet the required standard of care.326
Even if judged by the standards of the industry, HMA and PBBP behaved negligently in continuing the prison plasma center long after such
programs were widely discontinued.327 By the end of 1982, given the FDA
recommendations, all of the major American fractionators had stopped
collecting donations from paid donors, and it was well known in the industry that prison blood was significantly riskier than the blood of the majority of the population.328
Further, the hypothetical Arkansas case can be distinguished from a
case such as Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, an important California plasma
transfusion case, in which the court determined that even though the de323
Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Serv., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (holding that
the plaintiff must prove that the Red Cross failed to meet industry standards).
324
See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 860–61 (8th Cir. 1989). Though
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, this case involved events that occurred in Arkansas, and
was originally tried in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. See id. at 859.
325
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 524–26 (Colo. 1992). But see
Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391, 396 (Nev. 1993) (rejecting Quintana as an
outlier).
326
See Miller, supra note 31, at 473.
327
See, e.g., Fuentes v. Vose, 53 F.3d 327 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that the Rhode Island
Adult Correctional Institutions ended their prison blood donation program in 1983).
328
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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fendant intentionally utilized and paid a slum population for their donations, such practice was not negligent because of an insufficiency of volunteer blood donors.329 The major difference is that the defendant in Fogo
possessed a different level of knowledge than the administrators at Cummins: the Fogo decision came down in 1977, five years before the FDA
recommended ending the use of paid donors.330 Moreover, though the
defendants in Fogo permitted donations from persons who were “unclean,
elderly, transients, alcoholics and otherwise debilitated,”331 no evidence
presented indicated the conditions at the plasma center themselves were
dirty and corrupt.332
In contrast, HMA and PBBP did not meet industry standards given the
supposed conditions of the plasma program. This was not a situation in
which the plasma service providers simply failed to treat blood to prevent
hepatitis,333 or failed to screen one particular donor.334 Instead, the prisoners allegedly ran the plasma center themselves, and there are eyewitness
accounts and FDA documentation of over-bleeding, bleeding prisoners
known to be disqualified donors, a filthy environment, and incidents when
plasma was incorrectly stored but still distributed.335 As one Nevada court
held, a supplier of blood can be found liable if there is proof that measures
taken by the supplier “to screen donors and eliminate contaminated blood
fell below the standards promulgated and practiced by the industry.”336
This was certainly the case at the Cummins Plasma Center.
Finally, HMA and PBBP breached their duty of care by failing to follow the FDA’s recommendations to end the use of blood from paid donors. Even though this was a “recommendation” rather than a regulation, a
1989 Arkansas circuit court decision found that an FDA recommendation
that blood suppliers begin testing blood as soon as the required supplies
became available imposed a duty on them to do so immediately.337
Negligence can be shown by evidence of the defendant’s actual or
constructive knowledge of the risk his behavior entails,338 and HMA and
PBBP were given repeated warnings over the conditions at the plasma
329

See generally Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Ct. App. 1977).
Id.
331
Id. at 426–27.
332
See discussion supra Part II.C.
333
See Fogo, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
334
See, e.g., United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 517 (Colo. 1992) (determining that the donor to the blood bank was a homosexual infected with HIV).
335
See discussion supra Part II.C.
336
Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391, 396 (Nev. 1993).
337
See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 1989).
338
See Endres v. Endres, 968 A.2d 336, 341 (Vt. 2008).
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center, including through the recall of their product, revocation of their
license by the FDA, warnings about the risks of prison blood from the
FDA and the National Correctional Association, and the end of the prison
plasma collection system in virtually every other state.339
Based on the analysis above, HMA and PBBP breached their duty of
care to those who received blood from the prison.
c. Causation
It is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to prove causation in
blood and plasma liability cases.340 This frustration occurs because of the
difficulty in showing with absolute certainty the source of a contaminated
blood product (especially when hemophiliacs inject themselves so frequently341) and in establishing that one particular vial resulted in the
transmission of the disease.342 To make matters more complicated, during
the relevant years at issue for this hypothetical, Connaught purchased
plasma not only from the Cummins prison, but also from San Francisco,
where the blood bank confirmed several cases of AIDS343 and from where
the victims might easily have contracted hepatitis C.
In negligence cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation.344 The defendant’s breach of duty must be the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury, meaning that the defendant’s negligence must have
caused the injury and that the law would require the defendant to be responsible for his conduct.345 The plaintiff must be able to show by a preponderance of the evidence that one specific defendant caused the harm.
Courts virtually never permit plaintiffs to use either market share liability346 or alternative liability theory,347 either of which would ease the chal339

See discussion supra Part II.C.
Patricia Kussmann, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Blood
Shield Statutes, 75 A.L.R. 5th 229 (2000).
341
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir.
2007).
342
See, e.g., Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1.
343
Stumpe, supra note 180, at A1.
344
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., No. Civ. A. 94-0382, 2000
WL 282787, at *10 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2000).
345
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 351–53 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing
the limitations of proximate cause) (“The right to recover damages rests on additional
considerations. The plaintiff’s rights must be injured, and this injury must be caused by
the negligence.”).
346
Market share liability is a theory of liability utilized by plaintiffs in cases where
they were injured by a generic, fungible product that is inherently harmful, but they
cannot conclusively determine which company in an industry caused their injury. In these
340
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lenge of proving causation, because both allow the plaintiff to bring suit
against multiple parties when it is clear that one of the defendants was
negligent, but determining which one is impossible. For example, in the
hypothetical discussed here, two different administrators—HMA and
PBBP—both ran the prison plasma center. If a victim somehow managed
to prove that they received tainted plasma from the ADC during the year
when the two defendants overlapped, a court accepting the market share
liability concept would hold both HMA and PBBP liable.348 Precedents
from the majority of tainted blood litigation in the United States,349 however, suggest that unless the victim could decisively show which administrator distributed the contaminated blood product, the court would instead
hold neither liable.
The court in In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation addressed the problem of causation, agreeing with the plaintiffs that
the correct test for causation was the “substantial factor” test, but finding
that plaintiffs must prove that the defendant’s negligence was the cause-infact of the diseases they contracted.350 Even though the plaintiff in In re
cases, the court has allowed any producer of the product to be liable for its portion of the
market share at the relevant time, unless it can prove it was not the manufacturer of the
product. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 932, 936-37 (Cal. 1980). However, courts
have generally been unwilling to extend market share liability to blood product litigation,
because they believe Factor VIII is not a generic, identical, fungible, and inherently
dangerous product that would meet the Sindell criteria. See, e.g., King v. Cutter Labs.,
685 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Doe v. Cutter Biological, 852 F. Supp.
909, 913 (D. Idaho 1994).
347
The courts have also proven unwilling to extend the theory of alternative liability
to blood product litigation. Alternative liability arises when two defendants acted in a
simultaneous or similarly tortious manner and caused harm, but the plaintiffs cannot
identify the actual tortfeasor who caused their injury. In order to meet the requirements of
alternative liability, all possible tortfeasors must be before the court. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. f. (1965). See, e.g., Spencer v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 163
F. Supp. 2d 74, 79 (D. Mass. 2001); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F.
Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (S.D. Iowa 2001), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
380 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2004).
348
See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 281, 286 (Fla. 1990) (holding
that a DES-plaintiff could recover from the defendants based on market share liability,
because she could not determine which defendant caused the harm); McCormack v.
Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass. 1985) (“[T]he magnitude of the physical and psychological injuries which are at issue in DES cases counsels toward permitting
a remedy under some form of a market-share theory of liability.”).
349
Hawaii proves to be the exception: in one case the court permitted the plaintiffs in
Factor VIII litigation to use market share liability. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,
823 P.2d 717, 729 (Haw. 1991).
350
In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., No. Civ. A. 94-0382, 2000
WL 282787, at *10 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2000).
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Factor VIII kept logs of his Factor VIII infusions (including the manufacturers’ details), the court found this evidence insufficient to conclusively
prove which batch caused his HIV infection.351
Often, a plaintiff involved in tainted blood litigation can prove only
that it is likely that he contracted the disease from one provider,352 but the
general response has been that a strong likelihood of causation is not sufficient to prove causation.353 The plaintiff is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s negligence directly caused his
injury.354
Proving this element is so problematic that even the three plaintiffs in
Britain who claimed they could trace their infection directly back to the
Arkansas prison would face enormous difficulties in establishing causation.355 Given the time it takes for HIV356 and hepatitis C to manifest after
infection,357 it is nearly impossible to prove that one particular vial caused
the disease for a hemophiliac plaintiff, because the time of infection cannot be confirmed.358 In the case of Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., even
though the named defendants held between 88 and 94.5% of the market
share over the years when the plaintiff used Factor VIII,359 and the date of
the plaintiff’s infection could be pinned down to within a range of a
year,360 the court found this insufficient to prove causation and approved
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.361 As the court stated, “Doe
I became infected by the HIV virus on one particular occasion from one
particular product,”362 and he could even have been exposed to blood
351

Id. at *11.
See, e.g., Spencer, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (granting defendants’ motion for summary
judgment because of plaintiff’s inability to conclusively prove causation).
353
See Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 380 F.3d at 406.
354
Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., No. 88-392-CIV-T-15C, 1990 WL 369571, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1990).
355
See discussion supra Part III.B.
356
HIV infections may take at least two to six weeks to manifest after the date of infection. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (S.D.
Iowa 2001), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 380 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, a person can be exposed to AIDS and not become infected with the disease.
See id.
357
Hepatitis C has a six to eight-month incubation period. Mellis v. N.Y. State Dept. of
Corr., 779 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (App. Div. 2004).
358
See Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 380 F.3d at 406 (“[T]here is no way to identify the moment of infection.”).
359
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
360
See id. at 1008.
361
See id. at 1012.
362
Id. at 1013 (emphasis added).
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products containing HIV after the date of infection, which would not impact his diagnosis.363
However, in the same case for plaintiff Doe II, because the experts
generally agreed on the date of infection, and because the named defendants owned one hundred percent of the market share of Factor IX at the
time of infection, the court denied summary judgment for the defendants.364 Yet Doe II had not even successfully proven causation: he had
only managed to convince the court that a material question of fact existed, allowing the case to proceed to trial.365
Thus, the burden of proving causation is incredibly high, and this is
only for the plaintiffs to pass summary judgment. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. is a fairly recent case, and it indicates that, to establish causation, a petitioner involved in blood product litigation must be able to determine the exact product, on the exact date, by the exact manufacturer. If
the court applied this standard in the current hypothetical case, it would
likely be hopeless for any significant number of the victims to ever overcome their burden of proof. The court’s reasoning in Baxter Healthcare
makes it virtually impossible for a victim of tainted blood product to ever
successfully prove causation.
d. Injury
Finally, to obtain a favorable ruling, the plaintiffs must also show injury, which in this theoretical case should not be problematic. Generally,
damages are self-evident when the plaintiff suffers from a potentially fatal
disease contracted through contaminated blood products.366 Examples of
other injuries the plaintiffs might assert include medical expenses, loss of
earnings, and mental and emotional distress.367
e. Outcome
Although the plaintiffs in a hypothetical negligence case against HMA
and PBBP could establish that they were owed a duty of care, and that the
defendants had breached that duty, the cause of action would ultimately

363
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365
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fail because the plaintiffs would be unable to sufficiently prove that the
defendants’ negligent conduct caused their injury.
CONCLUSION
The blood business is a “uniquely favored industry,”368 one of the most
profitable and critical enterprises in the world, as it permits the sale, manufacturing, and transfusion of life-saving blood and blood products.369
American methods have long been considered the gold standard of blood
distribution,370 and American blood and plasma companies dominate the
majority of the world market.371 Especially because most countries do not
have the resources to gather as much blood and plasma as the U.S. does,372
they depend on the American system to be safe, transparent, and progressive. However, as the hypothetical Arkansas prison lawsuit demonstrates,
the system ultimately fails the victims.
Courts and legislatures face difficult decisions in dealing with the liability of blood and blood product suppliers because they must wrestle with
the dueling desire of ensuring the safety of the product for the population
and the responsibility of keeping the blood industry solvent and willing to
continue selling such a risky commodity.373 The industry almost always
triumphs in this calculus.374 Despite victims’ repeated attempts to hold
these producers accountable for tainted blood, the blood business remains
effectively unscathed because so few lawsuits against it prove successful.375
As the Arkansas plasma center hypothetical illustrates, under the
American legal system, it is virtually impossible for casualties of tainted
blood products to conclusively determine causation.376 Because of blood
shield laws, negligence is a plaintiff’s only realistic recourse against the
blood industry; however, these negligence actions repeatedly fail because
the plaintiffs cannot meet the high burden of proving causation, and courts

368

Conk, supra note 291, at 1089.
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generally refuse to ease this burden by permitting market share or alternative liability theories.377
In the hypothetical case discussed, even if viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a negligence cause of action would fail, despite
the mountain of allegations that the Cummins Plasma Center operated in a
manner that clearly created a breeding ground for disease, and resulted in
a substantial likelihood of tainted plasma products being distributed.
The outcome of such a hypothetical is extremely relevant to the global
blood industry today, as foreign victims of contaminated blood sold from
America continue to seek justice.378 Emerging economies like China and
Brazil are facing litigation from victims of their own for-profit plasma
centers,379 and they will likely look to United States’ precedents for guidance. Another example is Iraq, whose previous government forcibly injected HIV-tainted plasma imported from France into a group of hemophiliacs.380 This group now hopes to bring a civil suit against the French
companies involved, which, thus far, have ignored calls for acknowledging accountability.381 Considering the United States’ position in helping
establish the emerging Iraqi legal system,382 the reaction of our own courts
to similar cases influences the likelihood of this lawsuit ever being tried,
and thus the chances of success for the sufferers.
The Arkansas Prison Plasma hypothetical illustrates one example of a
system that provides blood and plasma providers with the wrong incen377

See Dorney, supra note 19, at 176–77.
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suffering from HIV and their efforts to bring a lawsuit against the French plasma producers).
381
See id.
382
See id.
378

644

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:597

tives.383 Despite the inquiries and responses of the Canadian and British
governments, which clearly show that the conditions at Cummins were
unacceptable and that hemophiliacs suffered and died as a result of these
conditions, the United States has failed to respond to calls for an investigation, or even to acknowledge the victims at all.384
The American system discourages this story from being told,385 and
even worse, it protects those who callously bled donors from high-risk
populations and who, knowing the danger of infection to the recipients,
distributed and sold the blood products anyway.
Most of the victims of tainted blood are looking for something much
more important than money: they want recognition and retribution, and the
United States has refused even to encourage the blood industry to supply
this acknowledgement.386 In the heartbreaking words of one hemophiliac
attempting to join a class action suit: “I don’t give a shit about the compensation. What are the chances of putting these criminals in jail? I’ll give
you everything I’ve got. I’ll sell my house, I’ll sell my business—just get
those sonofabitches!”387 Unfortunately, the bloody, dirty, sad truth is that
this victim, like so many others, will probably never prevail.
Sophia Chase
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